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Abstract 
Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) is a transdiagnostic process that serves to maintain 
emotional disorders. Metacognitive theory suggests that positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs guide the selection of RNT as a coping strategy which, in turn, increases 
psychological distress. The aim of this study was to test the indirect effect of metacognitive 
beliefs on psychological distress via RNT. Patients (N = 52) with primary and non-primary 
generalized anxiety disorder attended a brief, six-week group metacognitive therapy program 
and completed measures of metacognitive beliefs, RNT, and symptoms at the first and final 
treatment sessions, and at a one-month follow-up. Prospective indirect effects models found 
that negative metacognitive beliefs (but not positive metacognitive beliefs) had a significant 
indirect effect on psychological distress via RNT. As predicted by metacognitive theory, 
targeting negative metacognitions in treatment appears to reduce RNT and, in turn, emotional 
distress. Further research using alternative measures at multiple time points during therapy is 
required to determine whether the absence of a relationship with positive metacognitive 
beliefs in this study was a consequence of (a) psychometric issues, (b) these beliefs only 
being relevant to a subgroup of patients, or (c) a lack of awareness early in treatment. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive and uncontrollable 
worry and hyperarousal (e.g., restlessness, irritability, muscle tension; American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). GAD has a lifetime prevalence of around 6% (Kessler et al., 2005; 
McEvoy, Grove, & Slade, 2011) and is highly comorbid with other anxiety disorders and 
depression (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001). In a large treatment-
seeking sample (N = 1127), Brown et al. (2001) found that GAD was the most common 
comorbid diagnosis for individuals with major depression. GAD was also the second most 
common comorbid anxiety disorder for those with another primary anxiety disorder. Studies 
investigating treatment effects and mechanisms of change in primary and non-primary GAD 
therefore have the potential to have a large impact by increasing the generalizability of 
findings to many real world clients. A recent trial of metacognitive therapy in a sample with 
primary and non-primary GAD found large effect sizes that were comparable to studies using 
samples with primary GAD (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al., 2015). The aim of the 
current study was to extend these findings by examining mechanisms of change during group 
metacognitive group therapy for primary and non-primary GAD. 
Worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden, 
and relatively uncontrollable” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). 
Worry is the cardinal feature of, but not exclusive to, GAD (APA, 2013; Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Worry is elevated in a range of emotional disorders, including 
depression, social anxiety disorder, and panic disorder (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & 
Nathan, 2013). Worry also shares many features with other forms of repetitive negative 
thinking (RNT), including rumination in depression and post-event processing in social 
anxiety (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010; Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh, 2005). These findings have lead clinical researchers to conclude that the 
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processes driving RNT are likely to be common across emotional disorders even though the 
cognitive content and associated emotional responses may differ (Watkins, 2008). 
Prospective and experimental research suggests that RNT contributes to the onset and 
maintenance of a range of emotional disorders and negative emotional states, and thus it is an 
important target for intervention (McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004). The common 
underlying pathological processes of RNT across emotional disorders, along with high rates 
of comorbidity, provide a strong rationale for targeting elevated RNT regardless of an 
individual’s primary emotional disorder. 
Wells and Matthews’ (1996) Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model 
provides a metacognitive account of processes that drive RNT across various emotional 
disorders. Wells (2004) defined metacognition as “…cognitive processes, strategies, and 
knowledge that are involved in the regulation and appraisal of thinking itself (p. 167)”. 
Within the metacognitive model, positive and negative metacognitive beliefs are thought to 
drive the initiation and maintenance of RNT, respectively. Positive metacognitions are beliefs 
that RNT is helpful in some way, such as increasing the likelihood that one can prevent, 
prepare for, or cope with adverse events. The more strongly an individual adheres to these 
beliefs the more motivated they will be to further engage in RNT as a coping strategy. Once 
individuals engage in RNT, Wells (2013) argues that negative metacognitive beliefs are then 
activated in individuals who are vulnerable to emotional disorder. Common negative 
metacognitions include beliefs that RNT is uncontrollable and dangerous, which lead to 
maladaptive and counterproductive attempts to reduce RNT, such as thought suppression, 
further threat monitoring, and avoidance (known as the cognitive affective syndrome). The 
escalation of RNT and negative affect resulting from these counterproductive coping 
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strategies serves to confirm the negative metacognitive beliefs (i.e., RNT appears even less 
controllable and potentially more dangerous), thereby continuing the cycle. 
Metacognitive therapy (MCT) is based on the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 
1996) and aims to modify positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in order to reduce 
reliance on RNT as a coping strategy, and to reduce maladaptive responses to any occurrence 
of RNT. Trials of MCT across a range of emotional disorders have demonstrated large effects 
on RNT and symptoms (Bailey & Wells, 2014; Dammen, Papageorgiou, & Wells, 2014; 
McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al., 2015; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2015; Rees & van 
Koesveld, 2008; Wells et al., 2012; van der Heiden & Melchior, 2014; van der Heiden, 
Melchior, & de Stigter, 2013; van der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 2012; see Matthews, 
2015). However, most MCT studies have used small samples and few have directly tested the 
theoretical mechanisms of change. Most of the evidence supporting the role of metacognitive 
beliefs in driving RNT to date is cross-sectional and correlational. 
In a clinical sample with GAD van der Heiden et al. (2010) evaluated a cross-
sectional hierarchical model and found that negative metacognitive beliefs mediated the 
relationship between the vulnerability factor of neuroticism and worry. McEvoy and 
Mahoney (2013) replicated and extended this model in a mixed-diagnosis sample and found 
that negative metacognitive beliefs mediated the relationship between neuroticism and a 
transdiagnostic measure of RNT. Other cross-sectional studies have found that the 
relationship between rumination and depression is partially mediated by negative beliefs 
about rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Roelofs et al. (2010) used structural 
equation modelling in a depressed sample and found that both positive and negative 
metacognitions lead to rumination and worry and, in turn, symptoms of emotional disorder. 
Longitudinal and treatment studies have also found support for an association 
between metacognitive beliefs, RNT, and emotional disorder symptoms. In a healthy sample 
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of university students Weber and Exner (2013) found that positive metacognitive beliefs 
predicted rumination two months later, even after controlling for baseline rumination. Weber 
and Exner (2013) also found a significant indirect effect of positive beliefs about rumination 
on depressive symptoms via rumination. A recent trial of internet-based cognitive 
behavioural therapy in a mixed sample with anxiety and depression investigated the 
relationship between positive metacognitive beliefs, RNT, and symptom change (Newby, 
Williams, & Andrews, 2014). These researchers found that early reductions in positive 
metacognitive beliefs and RNT mediated improvements in depression, and early reductions in 
positive metacognitive beliefs mediated improvements in anxiety, thereby demonstrating that 
changes in metacognitive beliefs temporally preceded changes in emotional disorder 
symptoms. This study did not assess negative metacognitive beliefs. Findings from these 
cross-sectional, longitudinal, and treatment studies suggest that metacognitive beliefs are 
associated with RNT and may play a causal role in translating a temperamental vulnerability 
for emotional disorders into increased engagement in RNT, which, in turn, increases 
emotional symptoms. However, further prospective treatment studies investigating both 
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs are required to build the case for these causal 
relationships, particularly from a transdiagnostic perspective in mixed-diagnosis samples. 
The main aim of this study was to examine whether changes in metacognitive beliefs 
during group MCT are associated with changes in emotional distress via changes in RNT in a 
mixed-diagnosis sample. Consistent with the S-REF model (Wells & Mathews, 1996), the 
first hypothesis was that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs would be positively 
associated with RNT and symptoms of emotional distress at pre-treatment, post-treatment, 
and follow-up. The second hypothesis was that negative and positive metacognitive beliefs 
would demonstrate significant indirect effects on emotional distress via RNT.  
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2.0 Method 
2.1 Participants and Recruitment 
Patients (N = 52) participated in a recent benchmarking study reporting outcomes 
from group MCT for individuals with primary and non-primary GAD (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, 
Anderson et al., 2015). Mean age was 38 years (SD = 14.3) and 60% (n = 31) were women. 
Most were employed (63%, n = 33), around half had a university qualification (52%, n = 27), 
and one-quarter had completed high school or less (25%, n = 13), and a similar proportion 
had a technical or trade certificate (23%, n = 12). Half were married or lived with their 
partner (52%, n = 27), with the remainder being single (40%, n = 21) or 
widowed/separated/divorced (8%, n = 4). 
 Patients were referred by general practitioners, psychiatrists, or clinical psychologists 
to an Australian specialist community mental health clinic for psychological treatment of 
anxiety disorders and/or depression. All patients completed a structured diagnostic interview 
(Mini International Diagnostic Interview; Lecrubier et al., 1997; Sheehan et al. 1997a, b, 
1998) at their initial assessment and principal diagnoses were nominated based on the most 
debilitating disorder. Patients completed a battery of questionnaires prior to their initial 
assessment (see Measures section), which were reviewed by the assessing clinician and 
patient as part of a comprehensive assessment. A collaborative treatment plan was developed 
with patients being allocated to the MCT group if they met criteria for GAD. One exception 
was patients with principal social anxiety disorder (SAD), who were referred to a specialist 
SAD group program within the clinic. Patients were drawn from 11 groups with between 3 
and 7 participants each. 
GAD (77%, n = 40) and recurrent major depressive disorder (MDD, 17%, n = 9) were 
the most common principal disorders, with one patient (2%) each having principal 
agoraphobia, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and obsessive compulsive disorder.  The 
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majority (63%) were diagnosed with more than one mental disorder.  All patients with a 
principal diagnosis of MDD were given a secondary diagnosis of GAD, while a quarter of 
patients with a principal GAD diagnosis were given a secondary diagnosis of MDD.  The 
most common other secondary or tertiary diagnosis was social phobia (n = 11), followed by 
recurrent MDD in remission (n = 4), hypochondriasis, simple phobia (n = 2 each), and 
agoraphobia, OCD, dysthymic disorder, and bulimia nervosa (n = 1 each). About two-thirds 
of patients were taking psychiatric medication (N = 35, 67%) for an extended period of time 
(median 1 year; interquartile range 6 months to 4 years) without responding adequately. More 
sociodemographic details are reported in McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al. (2015). 
2.2 Outcome Measures 
2.2.1 Repetitive thinking questionnaire (RTQ-10; McEvoy et al., 2010; McEvoy, 
Thibodeau, & Asmundson, 2014). The RTQ is a transdiagnostic measure of RNT that was 
developed from the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyers, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990), Ruminative Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and revised Post-
Event Processing Questionnaire (McEvoy & Kingsep, 2006) by removing diagnosis-specific 
content such as references to worry and depression symptoms. Example items include “Once 
I start thinking about the situation, I cannot stop” and “I think about the situation all the 
time”. Items are answered on a 5-point scale qualified by not at all true (1), somewhat true 
(3), and very true (5). The 10-item trait version of the RTQ used in this study has a robust 
unidimensional structure, is able to distinguish between clinical and non-clinical populations, 
is highly sensitive to change and has high internal consistency (αs ≥ .90 at all time points in 
this study; McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al., 2015; McEvoy et al., 2010; McEvoy et al., 
2014; Newby et al., 2014). RTQ total scores can fall between 10 and 50. 
2.2.2. Metacognitions questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
2004). Positive and negative metacognitions were assessed using the positive (MCQ-POS) 
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and uncontrollability and dangerousness (MCQ-NEG) subscales from the MCQ-30. The 
MCQ-POS is a measure of positive beliefs about worry (e.g., “Worrying helps me cope”, 
“Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future”), while the MCQ-NEG measures 
negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and dangerousness of worry (e.g., “When I start 
worrying I cannot stop”, “My worrying is dangerous for me”). Items are answered on a 4-
point scale qualified by do not agree (1), agree slightly (2), agree moderately (3), and agree 
very much (4). Both scales comprise 6 items, and scores can range between 6 and 24. 
Cronbach’s alphas in this study were > .80 for both MCQ subscales across all time points, 
except for the MCQ-NEG at pretreatment (α = .73).  
2.2.3 Kessler psychological distress scale-10 (K10, Kessler et al., 2002). The K10 is 
a widely used general measure of psychological distress (e.g., Dear et al., 2011; Farchione et 
al., 2012; Newby et al., 2014).  It comprises 10 items assessing common depressive and 
anxiety symptoms. Example items include “About how often did you feel tired out for no 
good reason?”, “About how often did you feel nervous?”, and “About how often did you feel 
hopeless?” Items are answered on a 5-point scale qualified by none of the time (1), a little of 
the time (2), some of the time (3), most of the time (4), and all of the time (5). Total scores 
can range between 10 and 50. Cronbach’s alphas for the K10 exceeded .89 at each time point 
in the current study.  
2.3 Procedure & Treatment 
Patients completed a questionnaire battery prior to their initial assessment session, at 
which the MINI was administered by a Clinical Psychologist experienced in both the 
assessment and treatment of emotional disorders. All assessing and treating clinicians had 
completed masters or doctorate degrees in clinical psychology, and all cases were presented 
at weekly supervision meetings where diagnoses, treatment plans, and patient progress were 
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discussed. All measures were completed prior to the first session, and following session 6 
(post-treatment) and session 7 (follow-up). 
The group MCT program (Anderson & Campbell, 2011) was modified from Wells 
(2009) and comprised six two-hour sessions (Session1-6) plus a one-month follow-up 
(Session 7). Treatment fidelity was supported by the use of a treatment manual that included 
detailed therapist notes, worksheets, and client handouts. All groups were co-facilitated by 
one (7 groups) or two senior therapists (1 group), or one senior therapist plus one trainee 
therapist (3 groups). All senior therapists had extensive experience providing psychological 
interventions in previous trials (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, & Thibodeau, 2015; 
McEvoy & Nathan, 2007; McEvoy, Nathan, Rapee, & Campbell, 2012). The study was 
approved by the Health Services’ Human Research Ethics Committee (#QI 2014_04) and all 
patients provided informed written consent for their data to be used for quality improvement 
and research purposes. 
Session 1 included psychoeducation about the nature of worry and rumination (RNT), 
including maintaining factors (i.e., negative beliefs about RNT, unhelpful behaviors aiming 
to stop RNT, attentional biases, and positive beliefs about RNT). Session 2 began with a 
homework review, whereas the remaining sessions began with an attention training exercise 
followed by a homework review, before discussing the new content and finally setting 
homework for the following week. Session 2 targeted uncontrollability metacognitions and 
introduced attention training skills. Attention training skills included exercises to sustain 
attention on present moment activities and mindfulness exercises. Session 3 focused on 
identifying and challenging dangerousness metacognitions and patients were taught questions 
to determine the veracity of the information they gathered with respect to their negative 
beliefs about RNT. Session 4 focused on challenging positive metacognitions. Sessions 2 to 4 
included an evidence-testing exercise with the whole group, which involved identifying 
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evidence for and against the target metacognitive beliefs. Each session also involved 
behavioural experiments to test the beliefs. For instance, uncontrollability beliefs were 
challenged using a postponement experiment, whereby RNT was delayed to a scheduled 
‘worry time’. Dangerousness beliefs and positive beliefs were tested using ‘worry up’ and 
‘worry down’ days, where patients observed whether their predictions were more, less, or 
equally likely when they worried more or less.  Session 5 introduced active coping 
(structured problem-solving) as a technique for constructively managing solvable problems 
that required action, as an alternative to responses indicative of the Cognitive Affective 
Syndrome (e.g., avoidance, repeated checking). Session 6 involved a review of the key 
principles and the development of self-management plans for relapse prevention. The one-
month follow-up session served the dual purposes of reviewing progress and self-
management plans in an attempt to reduce relapse and collecting maintenance data. A more 
detailed description of the protocol is provided in McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al. 
(2015). 
2.4 Data Analyses 
2.4.1 Bivariate associations.  Cross-sectional relationships between metacognitions, 
RNT and symptoms were explored by creating scatterplots between each pair of variables at 
pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up.  Linear and non-linear regression lines were 
superimposed on the scatterplots, to inspect whether relationships between variables were 
linear or more complex.  The strength of linear associations was quantified by computing 
Pearson correlation coefficients. Associations between change scores (pre- to post-treatment, 
and from pre-treatment to follow-up) for metacognitions, RNT and symptoms were examined 
using the same methods as for the cross-sectional data. 
 2.4.2 Indirect effects models.  Four longitudinal models were used to test whether 
changes in metacognitions during treatment (the independent variable, IV) had an indirect 
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effect on changes in symptoms (the dependent variable, DV) via changes in RNT (the 
mediator). The only differences between the models were (i) in models 1 and 2 the IV was 
negative metacognitions whereas in models 3 and 4 the IV was positive metacognitions, and 
(ii) models 1 and 3 were fit using pre-to-post treatment change scores, whereas models 2 and 
4 were fit using pre-treatment to follow up change scores. 
 The path between the IV and mediator (a) quantifies the number of units the mediator 
changes for each 1 unit increase in the IV.  The b path quantifies the relationship between 
mediator and DV, controlling for the IV.  Multiplying the a and b paths gives the indirect (or 
‘mediated’) effect of metacognitions on symptoms via RNT.  The c’ path is the direct effect 
of metacognitions on symptoms, controlling for the indirect effect. The c’ path represents the 
extent to which metacognitions cause symptom change through mechanisms other than RNT. 
2.4.3 Significance and magnitude of indirect effects. Indirect effects models were 
tested using a generalization of the bootstrap approach popularized by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004; see also Hayes, 2013).  Bootstrap tests of indirect effects use computer simulations to 
calculate a 95% confidence interval for the ab coefficient. An interval that does not include 
zero is interpreted as evidence of an indirect effect. There was a small amount of missing data 
ranging from n = 1 (2%) on the MCQ at pre-treatment to n = 15 (29%) on the K10 at follow 
up. The missing scores were handled using multiple imputation (MI), which is one of the 
gold standard methods for handling missing data recommended in expert statistical guidelines 
(e.g., National Research Council Panel on Handling Missing Data in Clinical Trials, 2010). In 
order to conduct bootstrap tests of indirect effects using the imputed data, we used the 
MI(BOOT) procedure described in Wu and Jia (2013). 
The ab coefficient is an effect size, but it can be hard to interpret because it is 
unstandardized. Therefore, two additional standardized indices for quantifying the magnitude 
of indirect effects are recommended by Preacher and Kelley (2011) and Hayes (2013). The 
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first of these, abcs, is a completely standardized version of ab that measures what impact a 1 
SD change in the IV has on the DV, via the mediator. For example, if abcs = .3, it would mean 
that a 1 SD reduction in metacognitions during treatment would cause symptoms to reduce by 
0.3 SD, due to the indirect effect metacognitions have on symptoms via RNT.  
The second standardized effect is kappa squared (κ2), which is the ratio of the 
observed indirect effect (ab) to the maximum possible indirect effect (abmax). The maximum 
possible indirect effect can be determined using the standard deviations of the variables in the 
indirect effects model and their intercorrelations (see Preacher & Kelly, 2011). For example, 
the maximum possible value of ab for a certain indirect effects model may be 5 units and the 
observed value of ab might be 1. In this case, κ2 = ab / abmax = 1 / 5 = 0.2. Preacher and 
Kelley suggested that κ2 values of .01, .09 and .25 could be loosely interpreted as small, 
medium, and large effects.  All analyses were conducted using the statistical software R 
version 3.1.1 (R Core Team, 2014). 
3.0 Results 
3.1 Cross-sectional associations 
Scatterplots revealed that the relationships between the variables were linear. Cross-
sectional correlations are displayed in Table 1. Consistent with the first hypothesis, negative 
metacognitions, RNT, and symptoms were strongly correlated at all time points. Contrary to 
the first hypothesis, relationships between positive metacognitions and the other constructs 
were weak and inconsistent. At pre-treatment, there were no associations between positive 
metacognitions and RNT, symptoms, or negative metacognitions, respectively. Positive 
metacognitions were significantly correlated with RNT and symptoms at post-treatment and 
follow up, but the size of the associations were numerically smaller than the magnitude of the 
relationships between negative metacognitions, RNT and symptoms at the same time points. 
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Cross-sectional correlations between psychological distress (K10), repetitive negative 
thinking (RNT), positive metacognitions (PMC) and negative metacognitions (NMC) at pre-
treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up 
  K10 RNT PMC 
Pre-Treatment    
    RNT .53 
      PMC -.07 .00 
     NMC .56 .67 .10 
Post-Treatment    
    RNT .69   
    PMC .33 .32  
    NMC .56 .56 .35 
Follow-up    
    RNT .70   
    PMC .35 .35  
    NMC .72 .60 .21 
Note. Bolded values are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
3.2 Change score associations 
Correlations between change scores are displayed in Table 2. Changes in RNT during 
treatment were associated with changes in negative metacognitions and symptoms. Neither 
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positive nor negative metacognitions were associated with symptom change. The same 
pattern of results was observed for pre-treatment to follow up change scores. 
 
Table 2 
Longitudinal correlations between psychological distress (K10), repetitive negative thinking 
(RNT), positive metacognitions (PMC) and negative metacognitions (NMC) 
  K10 RNT PMC 
Pre- to Post-treatment 
      RNT .44 
      PMC -.01 .19 
     NMC .24 .47 .52 
Pre-treatment to Follow-up  
    RNT .45   
    PMC .00 .02  
    NMC .07 .38 .54 
Note. Bolded values are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
3.3 Indirect Effects Models 
3.3.1 Negative metacognition models.  In Model 1 the IV was negative 
metacognitions and the model was fit using pre-to-post treatment change scores. The a, b, 
and c’ path coefficients for this model are displayed in Figure 1. There was evidence that 
negative metacognitions had an indirect effect on symptoms via RNT, ab = .23, 95% CI [.05, 
.52].  The value of abcs was .20, indicating that a 1 SD reduction in negative metacognitions 
indirectly results in a 0.2 SD drop in symptoms, and κ2 = .19, which according to Preacher 
and Kelley’s (2011) guidelines is a relatively large effect. McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et 
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al. (2015) reported that, on average, patients scores fell during treatment by 6.94 points on the 
MCQ-NEG and 6.26 points on the K10. Approximately 25% (1.57 out of 6.26) of the change 
in symptoms during treatment can be attributed to the indirect effect of the negative 
metacognitions via RNT. The small and non-significant (p = .82) c’ path suggests that 
negative metacognitions did not have a significant impact on symptom change through 
mechanisms other than RNT. 
 





Note.  Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals for each coefficient calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. 
 
The same pattern of results held for model 2 (using pre-treatment to follow up scores).  
The values of the a, b and c’ coefficients were .66, .35 and -.15, and the size of the mediated 
effect was the same as for model 1 when rounded to the second decimal place, ab = .23, 95% 
CI [.05, .46].  The standardized effect sizes were also nearly identical, abcs = .19, and κ2 = 
.19. Twenty six percent of the reduction in symptoms between pre-treatment and follow up 
could be attributed to the indirect effect. 
3.3.2 Positive metacognition models. In Model 3 the IV was positive metacognitions 
and the model was fit using pre-to-post treatment change scores. The a, b, and c’ path 
coefficients for this model are displayed in Figure 2. There was no evidence of an indirect 
c’= .04 
 [-.29, .37] 








b = .24 
 [.06, .41] 
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effect.  The coefficient for the indirect effect was less than half that of model 1, ab = .09, 
95% CI [-.03, .25], and the confidence interval included zero. The standardized effect sizes 
were also much smaller than for model 1 (abcs = .08, and κ2 = .09) and only 4% of change in 
K10 symptoms during treatment could be attributed to the indirect effect. For model 4 (using 
pre-treatment to follow up change scores) there was also no evidence of an indirect effect, 
with the effect sizes all being close to zero, ab = .01, 95% CI [-.15, .19],  abcs < .01, and κ2 = 
.02. The values of the path coefficients were a = .02, b = .32 and c’ = -.01. 
 





Note.  Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals for each coefficient calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-corrected (HC4) standard errors. 
 
3.4. Floor Effects 
There was evidence of floor effects for both metacognition measures, which was 
particularly pronounced for positive metacognitions (see Figure 3). Nearly half the sample 
had low scores (≤ 25th percentile) on the MCQ-POS at pre-treatment, and large proportion of 
patients had low scores at post-treatment and follow up.  For the negative metacognitions 
subscale there were no floor effects apparent at pre-treatment, but there were problems at 
both post-treatment and follow up. There were no floor effects apparent for the RTQ and 
c’= -.10 
 [-.38, .18] 
a = .36 







b = .25 
 [.09, .42] 
 Mechanisms of change in metacognitive therapy         18 
Figure 3. Distributions of positive and negative metacognition scores illustrating floor effects 
Pre-treatment Post-treatment Follow Up  
 
12% of patients score at the floor 
43% have scores <12 
 
35% of patients score at the floor 
78% have scores <12 
 
38% of patients score at the floor 




0% of patients score at the floor 
6% have scores <12 
 
18% of patients score at the floor 
64% have scores <12 
 
28% of patients score at the floor 
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K10, with scores being distributed over a range of scale points and away from the floor at 
pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow up. 
4.0 Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate mechanisms of change during group 
metacognitive therapy for repetitive negative thinking (RNT) in a sample with primary and 
non-primary generalized anxiety disorder. The first hypothesis, that positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs would be significantly and positively associated with RNT and 
psychological distress at pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up, was partially 
supported. Consistent with metacognitive theory, negative metacognitive beliefs were 
positively associated with RNT and distress at each time point. Positive metacognitive beliefs 
were associated with RNT and distress at post-treatment and follow-up, but not at pre-
treatment. The second hypothesis, that positive and negative metacognitions would have an 
indirect effect on psychological distress via RNT, was also partially supported. A significant 
indirect effect was found for negative metacognitive beliefs but not positive metacognitive 
beliefs. These findings suggest that reductions in negative metacognitive beliefs were 
associated with reductions in RNT which, in turn, were associated with reductions in distress. 
This was not the case for positive metacognitions. 
The lack of association between positive metacognitive beliefs, RNT, and emotional 
distress is inconsistent with metacognitive theory. The floor effect and resulting limited range 
of scores on the positive metacognitive beliefs subscale, compared to the other measures, 
may have attenuated its associations with RNT and distress. Attenuation of these associations 
would have limited our ability to detect direct and indirect effects of positive metacognitive 
beliefs on RNT and distress. 
One explanation for the relatively low average endorsement of positive beliefs, and 
lack of cross-sectional associations with other measures at pre-treatment, is that patients may 
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have poorer insight into their positive beliefs prior to treatment. Patients may instead be more 
preoccupied with the negative consequences of their RNT that brought them into treatment 
and thus find it difficult to acknowledge any perceived benefits (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, 
Anderson et al., 2015). It is noteworthy that the measures were administered prior to the first 
session, at which patients are socialized to the formulation and metacognitive beliefs are 
Socratically elicited. Future research should investigate whether administering measures of 
positive metacognitive beliefs more frequently will capture increases in insight (and thus 
greater endorsement) after the model is presented in session 1 and throughout therapy. For 
example, once uncontrollability and dangerousness metacognitions have been successfully 
challenged and modified it may become clearer to patients that they are opting to engage in 
excessive RNT on some occasions due to residual positive metacognitions. 
Wells (2013) argues that whilst positive metacognitive beliefs are commonly held to 
some degree by most individuals, negative metacognitive beliefs “…are the most pervasive 
and powerful influences in psychological disorder…(p. 188)”. Thus, another explanation for 
the floor effect may be that whilst negative beliefs are ubiquitous and invariably pathological 
in individuals with elevated RNT, positive beliefs may be genuinely held at a problematic 
level by only a subset of these individuals. Consistent with this possibility, there was a strong 
correlation between pre-treatment positive metacognitions subscale scores and change scores 
(e.g., r = .78 between pre-treatment positive beliefs and pre-treatment to follow-up change 
scores, compared to rs ≤ .32 across all other measures at the same time points). Therefore 
those who endorsed positive beliefs more strongly at pre-treatment changed more on this 
measure to follow-up, whereas change on other measures were less strongly associated with 
degree of endorsement at pre-treatment. Modules targeting positive metacognitions may only 
be required for those who endorse these beliefs at pre- or post-treatment, rather than being a 
standard component of MCT. 
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Yet another explanation for the floor effect on the positive metacognitions scale is 
that key positive beliefs have been omitted from the relatively brief MCQ-30 subscale. The 
positive beliefs subscale from the original MCQ (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) contains 
19 items, so may also provide a more comprehensive and sensitive assessment than the short 
version used in this study. However, previous cross-sectional studies using the longer positive 
beliefs subscale have also found relatively weak associations with RNT and symptoms (van 
der Heiden et al., 2010). Other research using versions of the Positive Beliefs about 
Rumination Scale (PBRS, Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005) has found 
significant and stronger associations between  positive metacognitive beliefs and RNT 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Roelofs et al., 2010; Weber and Exner, 2013), and that early 
changes in positive beliefs are associated with subsequent reductions in RNT (Newby et al., 
2014). It is noteworthy that there is little overlap in content between the MCQ-30 positive 
beliefs subscale and the PBRS, suggesting that the item content could potentially explain 
discrepancies in findings between studies using the alternative measures.  
Interestingly, changes in positive and negative metacognitive beliefs were not directly 
associated with changes in emotional distress. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that the focus of the program is on modifying RNT by challenging metacognitive beliefs, 
rather than immediate emotional symptom reduction. McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Anderson et al. 
(2015) reported very large effect sizes on measures of RNT and negative metacognitive 
beliefs during the program (Cohen’s ds ~ 2.0), suggesting that these cognitive processes were 
effectively modified. Effect sizes on measures of anxiety, depression, and psychological 
distress were smaller, although still moderate to large (ds = .66 for anxiety, .98 for 
depression, and 1.02 for psychological distress). Additional strategies may be required if the 
goal is to more rapidly reduce affective symptoms of emotional disorder. Relatedly, the 
intervention was relatively brief compared to other trials of MCT and, although this did not 
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adversely impact the magnitude of change of the key cognitive mechanisms, affective 
symptoms may reduce more slowly. Most patients reported chronic anxiety and depression, 
so it may be unrealistic to expect these symptoms to resolve further over a 6-week 
intervention and 1-month follow-up. Longer-term follow-up would be useful to evaluate 
whether the treatment effects on symptoms endured or even improved over time. 
This study was one of the first treatment studies to examine indirect effects of both 
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs on symptoms via RNT, and therefore the findings 
have important theoretical implications. Although our study is correlational so cannot establish 
causality, the major theoretical contribution is that our findings are consistent with the S-REF 
model’s (Wells & Matthews, 1996) contention that RNT is one important pathway through 
which modifying negative metacognitive beliefs can reduce emotional disorder. In fact, the 
lack of a direct association between negative metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress in 
this study suggests that RNT may be the only pathway through which changing 
metacognitive beliefs influenced emotional distress. However, it is important to note that 
several components of the S-REF model (Wells & Mathews, 1996) and processes targeted by 
the MCT program were not assessed in this study. For instance, the S-REF model suggests 
that inflexible self-focused attention and counterproductive cognitive (e.g., thought 
suppression) and behavioural (e.g., alcohol use) coping strategies also contribute to RNT and 
emotional distress. If these factors were assessed they may have contributed additional 
explanatory power to symptom reduction. 
Findings from this study need to be considered within the context of several 
limitations. First, larger sample sizes would enable more rigorous evaluations of multiple 
mediational pathways whilst correcting for measurement error (e.g., structural equation 
modelling). Second, administering the measures on multiple occasions during therapy would 
enable a more nuanced assessment of the temporal precedence of changes in metacognitive 
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beliefs relative to changes in RNT and emotional disorder symptoms (see Newby et al., 
2014). Multiple assessment points would also shed light on whether patients develop greater 
awareness of existing metacognitive beliefs during therapy, and at which points they are 
successfully modified. Third, future research should assess additional elements of the 
Cognitive Affective Syndrome so that the S-REF model (Wells & Mathews, 1996) can be 
more comprehensively evaluated. Fourth, the absence of a control group means that we 
cannot definitively rule out the possibility that the reductions in RNT and symptoms were the 
consequence of the passage of time, or other non-specific factors. However, McEvoy, Erceg-
Hurn, and Anderson et al. (2015) demonstrated that this program achieved similar effect sizes 
to previous controlled trials of MCT and that waitlist groups remain virtually unchanged on 
measures of RNT. Finally, although the intervention was associated with medium to large 
improvements across a large array of outcome measures including negative metacognitive 
beliefs, RNT, and distress (McEvoy et al., 2015), the lack of data on protocol adherence 
introduces a potential threat to internal validity. 
This study was one of the first treatment studies to assess the influence of both 
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs on emotional distress via RNT. The findings 
suggest that modifying negative metacognitive beliefs is a particularly effective strategy for 
reducing engagement in the pernicious process of RNT which, in turn, is associated with a 
reduction in emotional distress. The influence of positive metacognitive beliefs appears to be 
less critical to treatment outcome, although further research is required to determine whether 
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